de Oorlog tot de Beschaving vol. 10 (1912)

de Oorlog tot de Beschaving

vol. 10 (1912)

The Great War of Europe is progressing quickly to its very final stages, in pretty much the exact fashion as predicted by de Oorlog. 

* The important battle the game will come down to is waged down in the Mediterranean. The land war is over: the sea is the final battleground.

* England, Austria, and Russia are quickly becoming locked down into their endgame roles. There are very few (if any) strategic decisions remaining for three major powers in this game. England has no reason not to continue pressing her advantage; Russia and Austria must continue to cooperate in order not to lose the game to England.

* Italy and France, therefore, are the most important remaining players. This is a feature of the game's design: Diplomacy is beautifully balanced to ensure that the smallest nations (particularly in the endgame) have the widest range of options and the strongest leverage diplomatically. There is even still a reasonable chance of victory for both nations. We will consider both countries' options in some detail below.

The Mediterranean

First of all, as predicted by de Oorlog, the war is coming down to one thing and one thing only: the battle of the Mediterranean. Our journal has been harping on about the importance of this naval fight since at least 1907.

Here's a quick quote from vol. 6 (1906-1907) on this topic (and also including a note on Germany's fate, which turned out as predicted as well):

England's victory in this game would look exactly the same: the Queen will need to claim the entire coastline from Denmark to Portugal, land armies on the mainland (so as to capture Germany and France), and then be the first to sail fleets into the Mediterranean so as to claim Tunis and lay siege to Italy.  [Our current situation. -ed.]

England controls the entire Atlantic already: if the Queen can capture the coastal territories (Iberia and the Netherlands), she will be 90% of the way to victory. However, she will also need to look ahead so that she can get those fleets into the Mediterranean before Austria (or the Kingdom of Savoy) manages to lock down the Straits of Gibraltar. [Which she has accomplished! -ed.]

Along the same lines, Germany can see the importance of the Atlantic battle: as long as England controls the Atlantic, Germany's fate is sealed. No matter what happens in the East and on the mainland, Germany cannot win the game because of the constant threat from the sea. 

England's fleets threaten German land; the German armies cannot threaten English territories. This means the most likely victor in the West is England. Without a presence in the Atlantic, Germany's fate is without hope: no matter what else happens, in the endgame those fleets will simply move in and remove Germany from the game.

As we can see, this prediction was very close to the mark, not only with regards to the current important of the Mediterranean battle but also in terms of Germany's ultimate fate. As de Oorlog pointed out, a Germany which didn't make efforts to control the North Sea (and other important Atlantic naval positions) would be kaput no matter what kind of losses or gains the Kaiser made elsewhere. History has borne this out. 

England has made dramatic headway in the Mediterranean due to errors made by France and Italy, but nevertheless is suffering because of her top-heavy forces. She has more than enough in place to control her current holdings in Germany and the Nordic regions (including St. Petersburg, which unfortunately cannot hold out very long against naval assault and thus can be written off as an English victory for the foreseeable future). In the South (France and the Mediterranean), England is severely undermanned, however.

So long as the Russo-Austrian alliance holds, England cannot make any more progress in either Germany or the North. Once she claims St. Petersburg, Spain, and Marseilles, she will be at 15 Centres. Her only possible victories to finish the game will have to be Italian territory: Tunis, Rome, and Naples. (Unless Austria is foolish enough to let her slip past the line into the Ionian, of course: even a single fleet in that position would pretty well guarantee an English victory.)

The game now becomes: can England be stopped?

If the attack on the Mediterranean fails, England cannot win the game through military means, simply enough. (Because the Russian player knows the military tactics necessary to hold her back; at a less skilled table, she may have been able to pull it off.) 

At that point she will have to resort, instead, to trickery and diplomacy: of course, she will be trying her hardest to turn Russia and Austria against each other through any means possible. Hopefully, the Allies have enough sense to see that her only interest in breaking their alliance is her own. Neither has much interest in breaking the alliance unless England is severely reduced in numbers.

The French Situation

France was in a wonderful position a year ago: since England decided not to bring in her additional army to the French theatre, she was essentially at the President's mercy. If she didn't dance to his tune, she would lose the war of the Mediterranean and therefore give up any chance of winning the game. France could have claimed Paris and Portugal in 1911, putting himself back to 3 or 4 Centres and regaining his position as a major power in the game.

For some reason, it appears that the President has instead decided to turn suicidal: his units have abandoned their defensive position (and any offensive prospects) in order to aid the English push for victory. 

It falls on the other players of the game to decipher where this is headed. In most normal Diplomacy games, such a player would be considered to be engaged in collusive play, and typically either kicked out of the game or outright banned.

(This is no different than any other competitive game or sport, like Poker or a sports tournament. A player who is not in the game to compete at his best ruins the proceedings for everyone else. A good recent example is the two badminton teams who were disqualified from the most recent Olympics. If such play is accepted in a competitive environment, the entire endeavour becomes toxic -- or at least pointless -- and therefore such seemingly "strict" measures are quite reasonable. To play a game other players are still enjoying with the sole purpose of ruining it for everyone else is never a laudable act, and shouldn't be tolerated. In this case, of course, we're not talking of any kind of punitive measures. It would simply mean that the French player should honourably offer to surrender and withdraw from the game if he does not believe there are any worthwhile goals remaining for him to pursue.)

We will need to see whether the French player is indeed engaging in collusive play or whether he is pursuing some French goals which he sincerely believes will further his chances of winning. However, the burden of proof is quite arguably on France at this point.

Why Keep Playing?

Both France and Italy, in fact, have many options remaining to them:

* The smaller nations in an endgame situation in Diplomacy, due to the game's design, have a wide array of diplomatic options available to them. 

* The best way to play a minor party in an endgame is to realize the diplomatic leverage available and to use it to its full extent. A small nation near the endgame has every right to make unreasonable demands (after all, their life is on the line!), make audacious goals, and demand huge concessions from their larger neighbours. This is the way they should be played, and remarkably effective when the leader is unafraid to use this aspect of the game's design. 

(As a simple example, consider how Austria and England collectively agreed to hand over three Centres to Italy and France without a fight in 1910! That was correct play for all parties involved, and thoroughly illustrates the true power the minor nations have in this position. After all, a larger nation cannot honestly argue that making small concessions threatens their well-being, whereas the converse is very much true for the minority parties in the negotiations.)

* This can be seen very dramatically in the history of the first Great War (played two years ago): three of the four major players in the endgame had at one point or another been reduced to a single unit. It was precisely this feature of Diplomacy's design which led to their subsequent rise to power.

In France's case, we can clearly see why: so long as France does not cooperate with England, her chances of winning plummet dramatically. Therefore, it is rational for the Queen to submit to "unfair" bargains with France in order to maintain her chances of a victory.

In a very real sense, the French position here determines the outcome of the game for England. France has every right to make outrageous demands and even expect them to be honoured by England. 

Likewise for Italy:

The Italian Situation

Italy is in a position where every single move (or inaction) has dramatic consequences on the board. As we saw in 1911, Italy's inaction (due to the King being away) completely transformed the board position: instead of England being ousted from the Mediterranean (and most likely forced to disband a fleet or two), Italy's passive orders allowed England to move into the Mediterranean and created the rather dire situation we have now. Without those actions, England would not be on the verge of victory in 1912, but fighting a defensive retreat in the Atlantic.

This lack of action had just as strong an impact on France's position: France's chances of survival have dropped dramatically due to the presence of English fleets in the Mediterranean. (Up until that happened, France had a good chance of holding his own.)

Italy now once more finds himself at a tense and important crossroads:

No other nation on the board has the same range of options, nor the ability to change the outcome of the game as dramatically.

As described earlier, the major players do not have this liberty: they are more or less locked into the status quo, with England pushing for victory and Austria and Russia forced into alliance by England's dominant position. (Incidentally, one possible way for England to break their alliance would be to back off from the assault and give them enough room to fight with each other. This was used to great effect by France in last year's game. However, that requires nerves of steel and tremendous patience--not an easy thing to pull off.)

Italy's goals can be separated into long-term and short-term:

Long-term Goals

* Long-term, the most important feature of the board for Italy is the dominance of Austria. As explained earlier in the game, so long as Austria is a) dominant, and b) unthreatened by Russia, Italy's fate will never be secure. Italy needs for Austria to be taken down a notch and for Russia to become the dominant power, strong enough to challenge and attack Austria. (This is why, as discussed many times in the past, Russia and Italy are allies-by-default in most Diplomacy games: it goes both ways.)

* The other threat to Italy's survival is the English victory (just as for everyone else on this board). Therefore, the other important goal for Italy long-term is to stall English advance. This involves, among other things, strengthening the French position at England's expense. (As discussed earlier, this could be interesting to England if she wants to break the Russo-Austrian alliance: in that case, it can be well worthwhile for England to withdraw a touch in order to allow all this to happen before making a new attempt at winning the game.)

If Italy can arrange for those factors to come into play while taking a Centre or two from Austria (either through war or, more likely, through negotiation, as was managed in 1910, when Austria voluntarily gave Italy two Centres), Italy has a very strong chance of becoming one of the three major players in the game with the next three or four years.

Short-term Goals

If none of that appears feasible (and clearly the first criteria above is almost impossible at this point in the game), Italy's best bet is an aggressive gamble:

* Encourage the English victory as much as possible while forming a defensive position along the frontier between Austria and England.

If, as seems very likely in this game, England's last two Centres required for her victory are Rome and Naples, Italy can occupy those two Centres and then demand Austria to support him in place. (If Austria refuses, England will capture Rome and Naples and win the game, so Austria can't really say no.) 

If Italy can pull this off, he could become one of the winners of a draw despite having only one or two units on the board!

Nevertheless, this tactic is a madman's gamble. It could just easily turn suicidal if the timing doesn't work out right. The long-term plan is much more positive overall if the appropriate parties can be convinced to make it work.

If Italy does choose to go for the mad gamble, Italy's interests would be the inverse of the above: he would benefit by a) making sure the Russo-Austrian alliance holds, b) England proceeds to the very verge of victory, with the final Italian unit or two being her final targets, and c) France must be eliminated as quickly as possible in order to speed up the English victory.

Tough choices, but rich, strategically interesting ones, backed up by the strongest diplomatic pressure available: Italy has more leverage right now than anyone else in the game, and for good reason.